Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties:
The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
by Jesse H. Hamner and Aaron T. Wolf
Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law and Policy. 1997 Yearbook, 1998.
Footnotes (not yet incorporated in text)
Introduction: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database
Approximately 261 international watersheds, and untold number of transboundary
aquifers, cover about one-half of the globe's land surface. This
vital resource -- a scarce resource which has no substitute, which has poorly-developed
international law, and the need for which is overwhelming, constant, and
immediate -- has driven its share of political tensions. Water has exacerbated
tensions around the globe, most famously in the arid and hostile Middle
East, but also throughout Africa and Asia.
The fortunate corollary of water as an inducement to conflict is that
water, by its very nature, tends to induce even hostile co-riparians to
cooperate, and even as disputes rage over other issues. In fact, the weight
of historic evidence tends to favor water as a catalyst for cooperation:
organized political bodies have signed 3,600 water-related treaties since
AD 805, versus only seven minor international water-related skirmishes
(each of which included other non-water issues). The only water-related
war between states on record occurred about 4,500 years ago. Given
this disproportionate evidence in favor of "hydro-cooperation," the processes
of conflict resolution and amelioration warrant more study, although at
present many scholars focus on the potential for violent conflict sparked
by water disagreements.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has identified more than 3,600
treaties relating to international water resources dating between AD 805
and 1984, the majority of which deal with some aspect of navigation.
Since 1814, states have negotiated a smaller body of treaties which deal
with non-navigational issues of water management, flood control, hydropower
projects, or allocations for consumptive or non-consumptive uses in international
basins. Including only those dating from 1870 and later which deal with
water per se, and excluding those which deal only with boundaries, navigation,
or fishing rights, the authors have collected full and partial texts of
145 treaties in a Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database at the University
of Alabama. The collection and translation efforts continue in an ongoing
project of the Department of Geography and the Center for Freshwater Studies,
in conjunction with projects funded by the World Bank and the US Institute
of Peace. Table 1 lists the treaties in the Database chronologically.
Negotiating notes and published descriptions of treaty negotiations
are also being collected in the Database, and at present the Database includes
fourteen detailed case studies. These cases include nine watersheds (the
Danube, Euphrates, Jordan, Ganges, Indus, Mekong, Nile, La Plata, and Salween);
two sets of aquifer systems (US-Mexico shared systems and the West Bank
Aquifers); two lake systems (the Aral Sea and the Great Lakes); and one
engineering works (the Lesotho Highlands Project). Table 2 lists these
case studies with some defining characteristics.
At present, few authors have undertaken systematic work on the body
of international water treaties as a whole, although some use treaty examples
to make a point about specific conflicts, areas of cooperation, or larger
issues of water law.
Treaties can tell about regional hegemony, about how and which water
needs are met, about the relative importance of water in the political
climate, about development issues, and whether earlier treaties have successfully
guided or guaranteed state behavior. This article summarizes the general
findings from a comparative assessment of the treaties in the Database.
To organize and analyze these treaties, a systematic computer compilation
has been developed which catalogs the treaties by basin, countries involved,
date signed, treaty topic, allocations measure, conflict resolution mechanisms,
and non-water linkages.
The contents of the Database are qualitatively and quantitatively assessed
for their provisions regarding the following criteria: basin involved;
principal focus; number of signatories; non-water linkages (such as money,
land, or concessions in exchange for water supply or access to water);
provisions for monitoring, enforcement, and conflict resolution; method
and amount of water division, if any; and the date signed (two sample summary
sheets are included as Figure 1). Preliminary descriptions of our findings
follow, and Table 3 provides a statistical summary.
One hundred twenty-four of the 145 treaties (86%) are bilateral. Twenty-one
(14%) are multilateral; two of the multilateral treaties are unsigned agreements
It is unclear whether so many of the treaties are bilateral because
only two states share a majority of international watersheds or because,
according to negotiation theory, the difficulty of negotiations increases
as the number of parties increases. In basins with more than two
riparians, this preference for bilateral agreements can preclude the comprehensive
regional management long advocated by water resource managers. One who
ignores the watershed as the fundamental planning unit, where surface-
and groundwater, quality and quantity are all inter-related, also ignores
hydrologic reality. The Jordan basin, for example, has been characterized
by bilateral arrangements; the only regional talks on the basin, the Johnston
negotiations of 1953-1955, went unratified. As unilateral development in
the basin proceeded in the absence of agreement, each state's goals and
plans abutted against those of the other co-riparians, leading to inefficient
development and even to exchanges of fire in the early 1950s and mid-1960s.
Similarly, India has a long-standing policy of adhering to bilateral negotiations,
presumably because it can best address its own needs vis-á-vis each
of its neighbors separately. Partly as a consequence, neither the Ganges-Brahmaputra
nor the Indus River systems have ever been managed to their potential efficiency.
Of the twenty-one multilateral treaties/agreements, developing nations
are parties to thirteen. Only one multilateral treaty exists between industrialized
nations for access to a water source, namely the treaty regarding water
withdrawals from Lake Constance signed by Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
in 1966. None of the preindustrial-nation multilateral agreements
specified any water allocations-all involved hydropower or industrial uses
The states surrounding the Aral Sea have an agreement, dated 1993, that
deals with several joint issues, but the text lacks allocations and provides
too little detail for planning water use. Like the Aral Sea, Lake
Chad also suffers from intense, poorly managed use and current deficit
water withdrawals. The Chad Basin treaty (1964), among Cameroon,
Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, deals with economic development inside the basin,
the lake's tributaries, and industrial uses of the lake, but lacks allocations.
The agreement does create a commission, which, among other things, arbitrates
disputes concerning implementation of the treaty. The commission prepares
general regulations, coordinates the research activities of the four states,
examines their development schemes, makes recommendations, and maintains
contact among the four states.
Most treaties focus on hydropower and water supplies: fifty-seven (39%)
treaties discuss hydroelectric generation, and fifty-three (37%) distribute
water for consumption. Nine (6%) mention industrial uses, six (4%) navigation,
and six (4%) primarily discuss pollution. Thirteen of the 145 (9%) focus
on flood control. The Database includes one treaty which primarily discusses
fishing (less than 1%) (included in the Database for other elements).
Monitoring (where mentioned; some treaty sources are from condensed
Seventy-eight (54%) treaties have provisions for monitoring, while sixty-seven
(46%) do not. When monitoring is mentioned, it is addressed in detail,
often including provisions for data-sharing, surveying, and schedules for
Information-sharing generally engenders good will and can provide confidence-building
between co-riparians. Unfortunately, some states classify river flows as
secrets, and others use the lack of mutually acceptable data as a
stalling technique in their negotiations. Most monitoring clauses
contain only the most rudimentary elements, perhaps due to the time and
labor costs of gathering data.
Data collected by signatories of the treaty can provide a solid base
for later discussions. India and Bangladesh previously could not agree
on the accuracy of each other's hydrologic records, but eventually agreed
on Ganges flow data and based a workable agreement on that data in 1977.
The cooperation between engineers or among council members of different
nations can result in the formation of an epistemic community, another
positive outcome of data gathering and sharing. Treaties do not yet
include provisions to monitor compliance, but such additions may bolster
trust and increase the strength of these epistemic bonds.
Method for Water Division:
Few treaties allocate water: clearly defined allocations account for
fifty-four (37%) of the agreements. Of that number, fifteen (28%) specify
equal portions, and thirty-nine (72%) provide a specific means of allocations.
All but three multilateral agreements lack definite allotments, although
a few establish advisory and governing bodies among states.
There are four general trends in those treaties which specify allocations:
(1) A shift in position often occurs during negotiations from "rights-based"
criteria (whether hydrographical or chronological) in favor of "needs-based"
values (based on irrigable land or population, for example); (2) In the
inherent disputes between upstream and downstream riparians over existing
and future uses, the needs of the downstream riparian are more often delineated
(agreements mention upstream needs only in boundary waters accords in humid
regions), and existing uses, when mentioned, are always protected; (3)
Economic benefits are not explicitly used in allocating water, although
economic principles have helped guide definitions of "beneficial" uses
and have suggested "baskets" of benefits, including both water and non-water
resources, for positive-sum solutions; and (4) The uniqueness of each basin
is repeatedly suggested, both implicitly and explicitly, in the treaty
This last point is exemplified in the unique treaty elements devised
by negotiators. The 1959 Nile Waters Treaty divides the average flow based
on existing uses, then evenly divides any future supplies (projected from
the Aswan High Dam and the Jonglei Canal Project). The Johnston negotiations
led to allocations between Jordan riparians based on the irrigable land
within the watershed; each party could then do what it wished with its
allocations, including divert it out-of-basin. The Boundary Waters
Agreement, negotiated with a hydropower focus between Canada and the United
States, which allows a greater minimum flow of the Niagara River over the
famous falls during summer daylight hours, when tourism is at its peak.
Fifty-seven of the treaties (39%) focus on hydropower. Power-generating
facilities bring development, and hydropower provides a cheap source of
electricity to spur developing economies. Some, however suggest that the
age of building dams will soon end, because of lack of funding for large
dams, a general lack of suitable new dam sites, and environmental concerns.
Not surprisingly, mountainous nations at the headwaters of the world's
rivers are signatories to the bulk of the hydropower agreements. Nepal
alone, with an estimated two percent of the world's hydropower potential,
has four treaties with India (the Kosi River agreements, 1954, 1966, 1978,
and the Gandak Power Project, 1959) to exploit the huge power potential
in the region.
Only three agreements deal with groundwater supply: the 1910 convention
between Great Britain and the Sultan of Abdali, and the 1994 Jordan-Israeli
and 1995 Palestinian-Israeli agreements. Treaties that focus on pollution
usually mention groundwater, but do not quantitatively address the issue.
The complexities of groundwater law have been described by more than
a few authors. Overpumping can destroy cropland through salinity
problems, either by seawater intrusion or evaporation-deposition, and therefore
the allocation of too much water (or one party's overpumping) can decimate
future freshwater supplies.
The Bellagio Draft Treaty, developed in 1989, attempts to provide a
legal framework for groundwater negotiations. The Draft requires
joint management of shared aquifers and describes principles based on mutual
respect, good neighborliness, and reciprocity. While the Draft recognizes
that obtaining groundwater data can prove difficult and expensive,
and mutually acceptable information relies on cooperative and reciprocal
negotiations, it does provide a useful framework for future groundwater
Negotiators may facilitate success of a treaty by enlarging the scope
of water disputes to include non-water issues. If pollution causes trouble
in a downstream country, an upstream neighbor may opt to pay for a treatment
plant in lieu of reduced inputs or reduced withdrawals. In such a case,
lesser amounts of high-quality water may improve relations more than a
greater quantity of polluted or marginal-quality water. Such tactics "enlarge
the pie" of available water and other resources in a basin. Non-water linkages
include capital (44, or 30%); land (6, or 4%); and political concessions
(2, or 1%). Other linkages account for ten of the 145 treaties (7%), and
there are no linkages for eighty-three treaties (57%).
Examples of these linkages can be found in the 1929 Nile agreement,
in which the British agreed to give technical support to both Sudan and
Egypt. In another example, the Soviet Union agreed, in lieu of payments,
to compensate lost power generation to Finland in perpetuity (the 1972
Vuoksa agreement). Britain even established ferry service across
newly-widened parts of the Hathmatee in India, in compensation for the
inaccessibility problems created by a dam project in the late 1800s.
Compensation for land flooded by dam projects is common. For example,
British colonies usually agreed to pay for water delivery and reservoir
upkeep, and the British government agreed to pay for flood damage to houses.
However, capital can provide compensation for a greater array of treaty
externalities and requirements, such as the construction of new water facilities;
the India-Nepal Kosi River Project Agreements, signed in 1954 and 1966
provide two examples.
Treaties which allocate water also include payments for water; forty-four
treaties (30%) include monetary transfers or future payments. As early
as 1925, Britain moved toward equitable use of the rivers in its colonies:
Sudan agreed to pay a portion of the income generated by new irrigation
projects to Eritrea, since the Gash river flowed through that state as
well. Treaties also recognize the need to compensate for hydropower
losses and irrigation losses due to reservoir storage: the 1951 Finland-Norway
treaty and the 1952 Egypt-Uganda treaty both include such compensation.
Again, these agreements emphasize the monetary aspect of water; they do
not describe water as a right.
Treaties may handle disputes with technical commissions, basin commissions,
or via government officials. Fifty-two (36%) of the treaties provide for
an advisory council or conflict-addressing body within the parties' governments.
Fourteen (10%) refer disputes to a third party or the United Nations. Thirty-two
(22%) make no provisions for dispute resolution, and forty-seven (32%)
of the texts are either incomplete or uncertain as to the creation of dispute
resolution mechanisms. Can a technical advisory body address disputes?
Perhaps, but the treaties do not expressly provide for such activity.
Historically, force or the threat of force has ensured that a water
treaty will be followed (e.g. British colonial treaties and the 1947 Allied
peace treaty with Italy ), but power is less desirable and more expensive
as a guarantor of compliance than mutual agreement. Britain could oversee
its colonial water treaties because it had one of the more powerful administrative
and military organizations in the world. Similarly, agreements on the Nile
generally favor Egypt, while those on the Jordan River favor Israel because
of their respective power.
While the conflict resolution mechanisms in these treaties do not generally
show tremendous sophistication, new enforcement possibilities exist with
new monitoring technology. It is now possible to manage a watershed in
real time, using a combination of remote sensing and radio-operated control
systems. In fact, the next major step in treaty development may well be
mutually enforceable provisions, based in part on this technology of objective
and highly detailed remote images, better chemical testing, and more accurate
flow computations than previously available.
The 145 treaties which govern the world's international watersheds,
and the international law on which they are based, are in their respective
infancies. More than half of these treaties include no monitoring provisions
whatsoever and, perhaps as a consequence, two-thirds do not delineate specific
allocations and four-fifths have no enforcement mechanism. Moreover, those
treaties which do allocate specific quantities, allocate a fixed amount
to all riparian states but one-that one state must then accept the balance
of the river flow, regardless of fluctuations.
One problem hampering the development of sophisticated water treaties
may have been the difficulty in acquiring information on similar settings.
Thus far, each set of negotiators has had to, in effect, independently
invent solutions. However, with the compilation of treaties in a single,
searchable collection, along with negotiation notes and case studies, the
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database hopes to provide researchers
and diplomats a useful tool to assess negotiating trends and workable treaty
solutions in the future.
- Acknowledgments: The authors are indebted to those agencies
which have helped fund different aspects of the Database, including the
US Institute of Peace, the World Bank, the US Agency for International
Development, Pacific Northwest National Labs, the Alabama Water Resources
Institute, and the University of Alabama.
- Address for correspondence: Dept. of Geosciences, Oregon
State University, Wilkinson Hall 104, Corvallis, OR 97331-5506, USA. Tel:
- A. Wolf, J. Kinsler, J. Natharius, and J. Danielson, Transboundary
Rivers of the World: An Updated Register. Unpublished Manuscript on file
with the author.
- Thomas Naff, Conflict and Water Use in the Middle East,
in WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD 273-74, 253-84 (Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon,
- Aaron T. Wolf, "Water Wars" and Water Reality: Conflict
And Cooperation along International Waterways (1997) (presented at the
NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Environmental Change, Adaptation and
Human Security, Budapest, Hungary).
- JErrold S. Cooper, Reconstructing History from Ancient Inscriptions: The Lagash-Umma Border Conflict (1983).
- FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION (1978,1984).
- See, e.g., Evan Vlachos, Prologue, WATER INTERNATIONAL,
15, 185-88 (1990); Ludvik A. Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development
of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 45 (1991); David and Joseph
Eaton, Joint Management of Aquifers between the Jordan River Basin and
the Mediterranean Sea by Israelis and Palestinians: An International Perspective,
in PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT MANAGEMENT OF SHARED AQUIFERS: FIRST WORKSHOP,
131-52, (Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, eds., 1994); DEBORAH HOUSEN-COURIEL,
SOME EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION IN THE MANAGEMENT AND USE OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER RESOURCES (1994); Joseph Dellapenna, Building International Water
Management Institutions: The Role of Treaties and Other Legal Arrangements.
in WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS,
55-89 (J. A. Allan and Chibli Mallat, eds., 1995); NURIT KLIOT, DEBORAH
SHMUELI, AND URI SHAMIR, INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES (1997). In two exceptions, Dellapenna
describes the evolution of treaty practice dating back to the mid-1800's,
and Wescoat assesses historic trends of water treaties dating from 1648-1948
in a global perspective. In addition, McCaffrey offers theories about trends
in treaty-making, specifically the move towards integrated management from
unilateral development, the move away from navigation as the primary use,
and the trend towards "equitable utilization." Hayton has argued that international
law should better address hydrologic processes. See, respectively, Joseph
Dellapenna, Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally-Shared
Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property, 26 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. ___ (1994); James L. Westcoat, Jr., Main Currents in
Early Multilateral Water Treaties: A Historical-Geographic Perspective,
1648-1948, ___ COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y ___ (1995); Stephen
C. McCaffrey, The Evolution of the Law of International Watercourses, 45
AUS. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 87 (1993); ROBERT D. HAYTON, U. N. DEP'T OF
TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NATURAL RESOURCES WATER SERIES,
NO. 20: RIVER AND LAKE BASIN DEVELOPMENT, 362 (1998) and Robert D. Hayton,
Reflections on the Estuarian Zone, 31 NAT. RES. J. 123 (1991).
- The compilation was created by Jesse Hamner. We expect
that both the full text of each treaty and the compilation of summaries
will be up-loaded to the World Wide Web by the fall of 1998. In the meantime,
an electronic version including one-page summaries of each treaty, is available
on disk from either author on request.
- I. William Zartman, The Structure of Negotiation, in INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION, 65-77 (Victor Kremenyuk, ed., 1991).
- AARON WOLF, HYDROPOLITICS ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER: SCARCE
WATER AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 44-52 (1995).
- GAIL BINGHAM, AARON WOLF, AND TIM WOHLGENANT, RESOLVING
WATER DISPUTES: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE U.S., ASIA, AND THE NEAR
EAST 121 (1994).
- See BINGHAM, WOLF, AND WOHLGENANT supra note 16, at 111,
- Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Republic of Austria and the Swiss Confederation Regulating the Withdrawal
of Water from lake Constance, April 30, 1966, Austria, Federal Republic
of Germany, Switzerland, 620 UNTS 191.
- Unpublished manuscript , heads of states of Central Asia,
- Robert Rangeley, Bocar M. Thiam, Randolph A. Andersen,
and Colin A. Lyle, INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA, 10 (1994).
- Convention and Statutes Relating to the Development of
the Chad Basin, May 22, 1964, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, TREATIES
CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER COURSES FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THAN NAVIGATION, 1984, at 8, U.N. Doc ST/ESA/141.
- Id. at 11.
- Sumit Ganguly, Personal Comm., 1997.
- Lincoln Kaye, The Wasted Waters., FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REVIEW, Feb. 2 1989, at 17.
- Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
Central Water Commission, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic
of India and the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on Sharing
of the Ganga Waters at Farakka and on Augmenting Its Flows, Nov. 5, 1977,
Agreements on Development of Inter-State and International Rivers (1979)
- EDY KAUFMAN, INNOVATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 34 (1996).
- Aaron Wolf, Criteria for Water Allocations: The Heart
of International Water Conflict, on file with the Journal.
- Agreement Between the Republic of the Sudan and the United
Arab Republic for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8 1959,
453 UNTS 51.
- U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE JORDAN VALLEY PLAN (SUMMARY
OF JOHNSTON NEGOTIATIONS), Unpublished Manuscript, rev. January 31, 1956.
- Treaty Between the United States of America and Canada
Relating to the Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950,
132 UNTS 224.
- See e.g. SANDRA POSTEL, THE LAST OASIS 40-43 (1992).
- Manisha Aryal, Dams: The Vocabulary of Protest, HIMALAYAN
MAGAZINE, July-August 1995, at 16.
- Terms of a Convention Regarding the Water Supply of Aden
Between Great Britain and the Sultan of Abdali, 148 Consolidated Treaty
- Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, Done at Arava/Araba Crossing Point, Oct. 26, 1994, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Israel.
- Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement Annex III, Art.
40, Sep. 28, 1995, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel.
- See for example Robert Hayton, The Law of International
Aquifers, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71 (1982); Albert Utton, The Development
of International Groundwater Law, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 95 (1982).
- R. ALLEN FREEZE AND JOHN CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 364-67 (1979).
- Hayton supra note 36 and Utton supra note 36.
- Robert Hayton and Albert Utton. Transboundary Groundwaters:
the Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. (1989).
- Although costly, gathering accurate groundwater data to
help determine safe yield for wells is probably not as expensive in human
terms as ruined cropland and saline water supplies.
- Exchange of notes between His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government in Regard to the Use of
the River Nile for Irrigation Purposes, May 7 1929, United Kingdom Foreign
Policy Documents No. 4, 1978, at 24.
- Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning
the Production of Electric Power in the Part of the Vuoksi River Bounded
by the Imatra and Svetogorsk Hydroelectric Stations, July 12, 1972, 884
- Articles of Agreement Between the Edur Durbar and the
British Government, July 20 1874, Consolidated Treaty Series 148 at 70.
- See supra note 43.
- See Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
Central Water Commission, Agreement Between the Government of India and
the Government of Nepal on the Kosi Project, Apr. 25, 1954, Agreements
on Development of Inter-State and International Rivers (1979) at 355, 369.
- Notes Exchanged between the United Kingdom and Italy Respecting
the Regulation of the Utilisation of the Waters of the River Gash, June
15 1925, United Kingdom Foreign Policy Documents No. 4, 1978, at 14.
- Agreement Between the Governments of Finland and Norway
on the Transfer from the Course of the Näätämo (Neiden)
River to the Garsjöen, Kjerringvatn, and Förstevannene Lakes,
Apr 25, 1951, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization
of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, United
Nations Document ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963), at 609.
- Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of Egypt regarding the construction of the Owen Falls
Dam in Uganda, July 16 1952, 207 UNTS 278.
- Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb 10 1947, 49 UNTS 1.
- Broad accessibility to the Database is encouraged.
The Database is not copyrighted (although due credit is appreciated), and,
as mentioned above, should be available in its entirety on the World Wide
Web by the end of 1998. Any comments or suggestions for future work are
welcome. We would also appreciate knowing about any omissions or errors.
This summary assessment is the first result from what we hope will
be continued systematic study of the treaties we have collected in our
Database. In other work, Wolf describes generally the process of water
disputes and dispute resolution, and specifically how the Database treaties
allocate water. See, respectively, Aaron T. Wolf, Interntational Water
Conflict Resolution: Lessons From Comprartive Analysis, 13 INT'L J. WATER
RES. DEV. In future study, we hope to assess the relationship between the
substance of the treaties and other geographic variables, particularly
climate, power relationships, types of government, and changes over time.
We would also like to assess mechanisms for conflict resolution for their