Publications

The Gulf War revealed stark realities about the landscape of the Middle East in the Post-Cold War. While massive global political changes had taken place from a bipolar world power structure to a unipolar power structure, relations were not improving among Middle Eastern states. Rather, the potential for regional competition and instability was still great, and it had become clear that what was at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. [1]

With the United States able to join forces and work on the same side with the Soviet Union for the first time in decades, and an unprecedented alignment of Arab countries working on the same side as Israel to reverse Iraq’s attack on Kuwait, the United States took advantage of the historic shifts both globally and regionally to restart Middle East peace talks. Speaking to the Subcommittee of Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee in May 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said, “…the Gulf War may have created some new possibilities for peace-making in the region and the United States has a unique obligation to help explore them.” [2] In the meeting, Secretary of State Baker discussed a broad framework for a future peace process that would include both bilateral and multilateral negotiation groups and a mechanism for ensuring Palestinian representation in the negotiations. The objective was to begin direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors using a peace conference to launch the process. Face to face negotiations he believed could offer the only way to make any progress. Five months later, on October 30, 1991, the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference under the co-sponsorship of the United States and Russia began a new chapter in Arab-Israeli relations.

The Madrid Conference for the first time brought Israel face to face with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan and its other Arab neighbors. “Peace in the Middle East need not be a dream. Peace is a possibility,” said President George Bush at the opening day of the Conference. [3] President Bush went on to describe several principles that he envisioned would guide the process. These included the following:

One of the touchiest issues for the Madrid Conference was the problem of how to create a means for Palestinian representation. On the one hand, the cosponsors recognized that Palestinian representation was imperative. However, any official PLO inclusion, at least at the outset, was clearly unacceptable. To address this potentially derailing problem, a formula was developed by the United States and Russia which called for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the conference whose Palestinian members would be from the West Bank or the Gaza Strip but could not have any formal affiliation with the PLO. This agreement proved to be a satisfactory solution for the early stages of the negotiations.

After three days of discussion, a framework for further negotiations was constructed which called for bilateral and multilateral negotiations to begin immediately. After much disagreement among the parties over a location for future meetings, the United States proposed that the bilateral peace talks would convene in Washington, DC in December. The multilateral talks were to follow a month later in Moscow. The Madrid Conference had launched a new era of relations in the Middle East and had done so by putting the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict front and center as the key to achieving a durable peace in the region. At the heart of this conflict were two core issues: security and territory. Secretary of State Baker acknowledged the sentiments of the parties and their concerns for a negotiated settlement at the end of the conference saying, “The parties have made it clear that peace by itself is unachievable without a territorial solution and security.” [4] One of the key subjects with regard to these two issues would be the future of control over and management of the shared water resources between Israel and the Palestinians.

While the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War enabled Israel and its neighbors to come together, recent natural events in the region would highlight the importance of water in the ensuing peace talks. Three years of below average rainfall had forced all the riparians of the Jordan watershed to cut back their water consumption. [5] In light of the past tensions and military skirmishes between Israel and its neighbors resulting from the ad-hoc management of the Jordan watershed, the current drought was a reminder that an agreement over water would be an integral component of a final settlement.

For both the Israelis and the Palestinians, access to water has been inextricably tied to the notion of sovereignty. Each group has claimed that control over water resources is necessary to ensure their economic growth and security. From its beginnings, the Zionist movement recognized the importance of control over water resources to ensure economic growth and self-sufficiency for their new homeland. Recall that Chaim Weizmann, who became the first President of Israel, made pleas with the British after the end of World War I to include the Litani and the Upper Jordan within the boundaries of Palestine in order to preserve economic independence. [6] Likewise, Palestinians argue that Israel’s regulations on wells in the West Bank since the war of 1967 have severely hampered their economic growth, which in turn has hindered the Palestinian people as a whole. These claims not only highlight the similarity with which each side regards the importance of access to and control over water resources, they also illustrate the stark difference in the bargaining positions each side holds with respect to the other.

What is unique about the relationship between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the peace process, including the discussions over water resources, is the power differential which exists as a result of their different political status. From the outset, this power asymmetry led each group to come to the negotiating table with sharply contrasting and adversarial positions and unequal bargaining leverage. By the end of the Gulf War, Israel’s economy was robust, it had control over the water resources that were under dispute and it would be going into the peace process with skilled negotiators and well documented information about the issues. By contrast, the Palestinians, who had sided with Iraq in the war, had been experiencing political fragmentation and less funding from Arab countries, which had lead to a financial crisis for the PLO. Inexperience with international negotiation and less knowledge about the water issues further added to this asymmetry. [7] As the two sides began the negotiating process, their positions were wide apart and separated by a sea of distrust.

With this history of distrust marked by bloodshed, the multilateral component of the peace talks it was hoped would provide a sorely needed avenue to move away from the old problems of the past toward building a new understanding of shared needs and regional cooperation. President Bush said of the multilaterals at the beginning of the Madrid Conference, “Progress in these fora are not intended as a substitute for what must be decided in the bilateral talks; progress in the multilateral issues can help create an atmosphere in which long-standing disputes can more easily be settled.” [8] Although it was regarded by some as naïve at the time, by focusing on issues of regional concerns like water, refugees, arms control, economic development and the environment, and leaving the more contentious political issues to the bilaterals, the multilaterals were intended to be a new forum for cooperation which could enable the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

Coming into the peace talks in 1991, the principle water in dispute between the two parties is the groundwater underneath the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The three aquifers that make up the Central Highland Aquifer (the Western Aquifer, the Northern Aquifer and the Eastern Aquifer) account for about 40 percent of the water used for Israel. Of these three sources of groundwater, the Western and Northern Aquifers are located on both sides of the green line, which separates Israel from the West Bank. [9] The Eastern Aquifer has the smallest amount of water and is totally within the boundaries of the West Bank. The West Bank has other sources of water, namely surface runoff and streamflow, but groundwater is the principal water source. The Gaza Strip has no other sources of water than from the Coastal Aquifer beneath it, except for negligible amounts of rainfall. [10] This aquifer is much shallower than the aquifers making up the Central Highland Aquifer, and consequently it is more easily overpumped. Because it is unconfined, the aquifer has become seriously contaminated from salt water intrusion, pesticides, and sewage. These two underground water sources, the Coastal Aquifer and the Central Highland Aquifer, have been under the control of Israel since the 1967 war. Although Israel has regulated these aquifers differently, the underlying source of dispute between Israel and the Palestinians centers around who will manage and control them.

The Palestinians from the outset of the negotiations emphasized the need to discuss water rights and the control over water resources in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian academics and policy makers have long pointed out the vast gap in water consumption that has existed between Israel and the Palestinians both for domestic and commercial purposes since the Israelis took control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. [11] Many facts and figures exist on this subject of unequal water consumption. Cecilia Albin notes that from 1967 to 1987, the Palestinian population increased by 84% but water supply for domestic use increased only 20% and water for irrigation purposes was frozen. [12] Because the Palestinian economy is primarily agricultural, this freeze in water supply Albin argues has severely hindered the development of the Palestinian economy. In the West Bank, water use and development have been tightly controlled by the Israeli military. In what is seen by the Palestinians as outright discrimination and hypocrisy, Jewish settlements in the West Bank have received large water subsidies to promote agriculture, while Palestinians have been denied permission to drill wells for agricultural purposes. Under a policy which recognizes only existing use of water, Palestinian water allocation in the West Bank has been frozen at the 1968 level with only a small amount of growth. [13] With this history of unequal water consumption, the issue of water rights for the Palestinians has been paramount as the means of ensuring guarantees to manage and control their own water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Whereas the Palestinians initially focused on the imperative for recognition of their water rights, Israel emphasized the practical and technical aspects of water resource management pointing out the urgent need to address protecting and managing the water resources of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Comparing the situation in the Gaza Strip to the West Bank illustrates these concerns. Israel’s strict regulations on water use and development in the West Bank was not extended to the Gaza Strip. Instead, an old Jordanian law on soil and water has been used by the Israeli military authorities. [14] With much less regulation, the water situation of the Gaza Strip has become a disaster both in terms of water quantity and water quality. Over 2000 wells pump groundwater from the Coastal Aquifer located underneath the Gaza Strip along with hundreds of illegal wells which have created severe overpumping and led to contamination of the aquifer from saltwater intrusion from the coast as well as from fertilizer and pesticide use. This in turn has created a public health problem with high incidents of childhood dysentery and parasitic infection. [15] The novelist Ghassan Kanafani described Palestine as the land of sad oranges. The water crisis in Gaza truly reflects this despair.

The situation in the Gaza Strip from the Israeli perspective was positive proof of their need to retain control over Palestinian water sources. Israel’s initial position going into the peace process was that they would not negotiate water rights during the interim phase. Rather, discussion should center around the technical aspects of managing water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and finding options for increasing more access to water resources. [16] It wasn’t until two years into the peace talks after the Likud government was replaced by a Labor government headed by Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, when Israel began to soften its position towards joint management of shared water resources, and later to address the issue of water rights.

Two months after bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors were initiated in Madrid on November 3, 1991, the multilateral working groups convened in Moscow to begin work on regional issues. [17] The multilaterals opened up the Middle East peace process to a wide range of interested parties by including along with the immediate parties in the talks eleven Arab states and 27 other states and international agencies. [18] With the United States as gavel holder, the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (working group on water) was one of the five working groups to convene at Madrid and played an influential role throughout the peace process by providing a forum to discuss options to regional water problems. [19]

This section analyzes the role of the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources within the negotiation structure of the Middle East peace process. Stephan Libiszewski, a political scientist and research scholar at the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research in Zurich, has suggested that the twin track “formula” of the Middle East negotiations, with the bilateral negotiations focusing on “high” politics and the multilateral negotiations focusing on regional issues and technical issues or “low” politics, could be an effective procedural model for other complicated disputes around the world involving multiple stakeholders. [20] Regarding Libiszewski’s analysis of the negotiations structure, I argue that the division of political and technical matters was not as neatly split with the multilateral negotiations only dealing with technical matters and the bilateral negotiations only addressing political matters. Rather, I conclude that the working group on water, by focusing on regional water issues and emphasizing the technical aspects of water, was able to create a less contentious environment to discuss water issues and in doing so promoted a greater level of trust between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Through its activities and projects, the working group facilitated the ability to make headway in the “high politics” of the bilateral negotiations. Beside providing an avenue for building trust, the working group on water provided a valuable component to the peace process in two principle ways. First, the working group through its regional and technical focus was able to address a broad range of water related issues promoting a more integrated approach to watershed management. Second, by bringing together all interested parties to discuss regional water issues and particularly by including a mechanism for the Palestinians to participate, the working group created an avenue to address the power imbalance which exists between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In light of the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement which was signed in 1995, the two-part structure of the peace process should be judged as a success.

According to a recent report from the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources which was presented at the Second Annual World Water Forum in The Hague, the multilateral track of the peace process is premised on the idea of “creating synergies through awareness of common problems, such as water.” [21] Although the model for the peace talks was open-ended from the beginning, a central theme of creating a positive dynamic guided the process. Several policies were adopted from the outset with the hope of promoting regional cooperation. [22] These included the following:

Through these guidelines, the working group on water was able to pursue its goal of regional cooperation creatively while using commonly agreed upon principles.

Over the course of eight official meetings, the working group on water brought conflicting parties together face to face to discuss future plans about their shared water resources. [23] This section provides a summary of the events that took place in the working group over the course of three and a half years and its relationship to the larger peace process.

The first two rounds of the working group on water were highly contentious. The Palestinians, at first part of a joint delegation with the Jordanians, immediately raised the issue of water rights, arguing that no progress could be made until this issue was addressed. The Israelis were adamant in their position that water rights were a subject for bilateral negotiations and that the working group should focus on the issue of management of water resources and options for developing new water resources. With all decisions made by consensus, nothing was agreed upon accept to meet again and continue the working group. As one participant wrote, “an achievement in and of itself.” [24]

Four months later, the working group on water convened in Washington, DC for their third round of talks. This meeting was more productive than the first two rounds. A consensus was reached among the participants about the four main areas of focus for the group. These were enhancement of water data, water management practices, enhancement of water supply and concepts for regional cooperation and management. The relationship between the multilateral and the bilateral tracks was also defined. The bilateral negotiations would deal with political issues while the multilateral negotiations would handle regional more technical issues. [25] By focusing on planning and leaving the politics of implementation to the bilaterals, it was hoped that the working group would provide a forum for building trust and generating options that would spill over into the bilaterals.

Frustrations resurfaced in the fourth round of the working group on water in Geneva as the issue of water rights was raised again by the Palestinians. The meeting was initially planned to work out the more mundane details around organizing a series of intersessional activities. These were intended to promote interactions among the participants of the working group and educate them about global water issues. However, the Palestinians brought up the issue of water rights and threatened to boycott the upcoming intersessional activities. With help from the Jordanians before a meeting of the working group on refugees in Oslo, the problem was resolved the following month. An agreement was reached to instigate an Israeli-Palestinian working group on water rights in the bilateral negotiations. This satisfied the Palestinians who agreed to withdraw their boycott and to participate in the intersessional activities. [26]

Two months later in July, the intersessional activities began. In the effort to foster trust and knowledge about global water issues, the working group on water developed a series of training courses and activities for its participants and other professionals from around the region. Twenty intersessional activities were organized, including a tour of the Colorado Basin and seminars on semi-arid lands. Fourteen training courses were also designed with topics ranging from basic overviews of integrated water resource planning and water quality management, to more specialized topics on groundwater modeling and the development of efficient irrigation systems. [27] These activities and courses provided a basic framework for understanding the issues of regional water planning, while creating multiple avenues for the parties to interact with each other.

On September 15, 1993, the Palestinians signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government. This agreement defined Palestinian autonomy and called for the creation of a Palestinian Water Administration Authority. The first line in Annex III of the agreement calls for “cooperation in the field of water…to include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.” [28] The Declaration of Principles was a milestone in that it addressed both the Palestinians’ interests on water rights and the Israelis’ interests about management of scarce water resources. It also marked a turning point for the Palestinians in the negotiations as they separated from the Jordanians and the PLO became their official representative to the talks.

The breakthrough of the Declaration of Principles was the result of secret negotiations, which began in January 1993 in Oslo, Norway. The secret Oslo talks sprang from a research project commissioned by the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO) for the Working Group on Refugees several months earlier, which was going to study the living conditions in the occupied territories. [29] Through this project, the director general of FAFO, Terje Larsen, the study’s primary author Marianne Heiberg, and her husband, the Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen, came into contact with Yossi Beilin, who was an opposition member of the Knesset. [30] From these relationships a series of secret meetings developed over the course of eight months between the Israelis, the Palestinians and the Norwegians.

Completely away from the media and public opinion, the Oslo negotiations succeeded in moving the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations forward. By providing a neutral diplomatic space, both sides could hold candid discussions without the concern of outside opinion or the influence of a powerful third party mediator. Even though the US government knew of the secret talks taking place in Oslo, it was not recognized the extent of the decisions taking place. For this reason, the Declaration of Principles came as somewhat of a surprise to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was briefed of the impending agreement by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Despite the surprise, the United States gave full support of the Declaration of Principles which was signed on the White House lawn. [31]

The fifth round of the working group on water in Beijing made substantial progress in each of the four topics agreed upon at the start of the negotiations. Recognizing the lack of water data especially for the Palestinians, the parties agreed on the need for regional databanks. The databanks would be established with funding help from the United States, Australia, Canada, the European Union, The Netherlands and France. [32] Finally, seminars focusing on water management and regional cooperation were organized. This included a seminar run by Austria about water technologies in arid and semi-arid regions, and a seminar planned by the United Nations on models for regional cooperation and a workshop on weather forecasting. [33]

After a seven-month hiatus, the working group on water broke new ground by holding their first meeting in an Arab country. Held in Muscat, Oman in April 1994, the sixth round of the working group started off on a tense note when it became known that the Palestinians were going to announce the creation of the new Palestinian Water Authority. Although this was planned for in the Declaration of Principles, there were some that questioned the appropriateness of the announcement at the working group. In the end, the Palestinian Water Authority was well received and the working group on water continued to make plans for regional water projects. The working group on water endorsed several proposals including one by Oman to create a desalination research and technology center in Muscat, and another from the United States to build small scale wastewater treatment facilities. [34]

The last two rounds of the working group on water were marked by strong financial support for the working group’s activities from the international community. Several of the delegations put forth new initiatives and offered to finance the working group’s projects. The United States and Oman offered to provide $3 million towards the establishment of the Middle East Desalination Research Center. Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands laid out their projects to assist the Palestinians in water resource management. Progress on the regional data banks project continued, and a new project financed by France was proposed to help assist in managing water crises. [35]

Compared to the Johnston negotiations, the working group on water made some important improvements to the negotiations about water in the region. Recall that the Johnston negotiations focused exclusively on the technical aspects of the conflict over water, they only dealt with surface water, and the Palestinians were excluded. By contrast, the two track structure (bilateral and multilateral) of the Madrid peace process, through the working group on water, opened a forum to address regional water issues and the technical considerations about water, which created the ability to address simultaneously both the political and technical aspects of the conflict over water. Furthermore, by facilitating various water-related activities, the working group on water has been able to promote broad aspects of watershed management. Finally, the working group on water worked to include all the major stakeholders, most importantly the Palestinians, whose participation is essential to the peace process.

The working group on water has been a crucial component in the effort to resolve the conflict over control and use of the water resources of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for the Palestinians and the Israelis. By focusing on regional water issues, the working group has been able to foster better relations and trust among its participants, which has had a positive influence in the bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, the ability to address technical aspects of water alongside the contentious political negotiations, and the inclusion of the Palestinians and other key stakeholders has allowed the working group on water to not only broaden the spectrum of issues toward a more integrated approach toward watershed management, it has also been instrumental in changing the dialog from a zero sum water problem toward mutual problem solving about water. In doing so, the working group on water has helped to create a more level playing field and, consequently has worked to mitigate the power imbalance between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

By providing an informal environment in which to discuss regional water issues, and building support and securing financing for regional water research and development projects, the working group on water provided a forum to promote trust and cooperation over water. It is difficult to put a measure on the development of trust. To get a sense of how far the Israelis and the Palestinians have come from the beginnings of the working group on water up to the present, one needs only to look at look how their interactions have changed. At the start of the negotiations in Vienna, the parties would only meet in formal sessions. According to one participant at this meeting, any interaction was stilted and the parties did not interact outside the big group. Now, Israelis and Palestinians are routinely working together in smaller groups focusing on substantive issues. Even though the working group on water has not held a formal meeting since 1996, participants have engaged in various activities quite frequently. It is also telling that during the times when the negotiations in the bilaterals have hit an impasse, the projects instigated in the working group on water have continued to operate and expand. [36]

In an indirect way, the effects of these confidence-building measures have spilled over into the bilateral negotiations. The creation of regional water data banks is one example of how the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral track has benefited from the multilateral track. One of the issues that the Palestinians had brought up in the working group on water was the lack of sufficient water data. In order to enhance data availability, regional water data banks were created. These data banks have not only assisted the Palestinians with more water data, as an official from the State Department remarked, the information from the data banks has increased technical capacity for all participants including those in the bilateral negotiations.

Through courses and seminars on a wide range of water topics and with the implementation of water projects to improve data availability, management practices, water supply and regional cooperation, the technical focus of the working group on water has broadened the scope and knowledge of water-related issues for its participants. The training courses were a particularly innovative element of the working group on water. These courses have helped provide the “institutional bridge” or common language for all participants in the negotiations. By addressing a wide range of issues, including water quality management, groundwater modeling and international water law, they have fostered an integrative approach to managing the Jordan watershed. The water projects have been a natural outgrowth of this process. Along with the regional data banks project which has helped to increase technical capacity, the new Middle East Desalination Research Center (MEDRC) in Oman will provide a location for regional cooperation through research and training in a technology which has the potential to greatly alleviate water stress in the Middle East. [37]

One of the most important components of the working group on water has been its inclusion of the Palestinians and generally its overall inclusive atmosphere. The forum included over thirty participants from all over the world. Although the Palestinians did not initially have their own voice in the negotiations, they were included from the beginning and eventually became a separate negotiating party from the Jordanians. Massive changes had taken place since the Johnston negotiations in the mid-1950s when the thought of including the Palestinians would have been impossible. After a decade which included the intifada, the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War, it had become clear to all parties involved in the peace process, including the Israelis, that the Palestinians’ interests and participation in the talks were imperative.

By bringing together all interested participants to discuss regional water issues, the working group on water provided a new channel which was more power neutral than the bilateral negotiations. In doing so, it helped to mitigate the political imbalance that existed between the Israelis and the Palestinians over access and control over water resources.

One way that the working group on water mitigated the power imbalance is by acting as a release valve for contentious political topics. This occurred in both directions. In one direction, it allowed a space for the parties to spend time together in a relatively safe environment where sensitive political issues could be postponed if necessary. [38] In the other direction, it also unwittingly allowed for political issues to be brought up. For example, this occurred when the Palestinians used the working group on water to announce their new Palestinian Water Authority. In a forum dedicated to nonpolitical aspects of regional water issues, this was a highly symbolic political announcement.

A further example relates to the events which took place at the sixth round of the working group on water in 1994. In this meeting, the head of Israel’s delegation to the working group on water, Avraham Katz-Oz, agreed to discuss the issue of Palestinian water rights. At the time, the head of the Israeli bilateral team, Noah Kinarti, attempted to ignore this development in the working group. [39] However, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had given Katz-Oz expanding leeway in the multilaterals. Katz-Oz’s decision to discuss Palestinian water rights has since been attributed with being the rationale for Israel’s decision to recognize Palestinians water rights. In August 1995, the new head of Israel’s bilateral water team, Gideon Tsur, who replaced Noah Kinarti, met with the head Palestinian water negotiator, Ahmed Qurei, and signed an agreement formally recognizing Palestinian water rights in the West Bank. [40] Shortly before Oslo II was signed, journalist Steve Rodan wrote, “The ramification of that decision to discuss water rights appeared in last month’s Israeli recognition of Palestinian water rights in Judea and Samaria. Senior Israeli officials, including minister Tsur justified their decision, saying that Katz-Oz had already set the precedent.” [41] Whether intended or not, in this instance the working group on water played a pivotal political role in the negotiations over recognition of Palestinian water rights.

A second way that the working group on water has been able to mitigate the power imbalance between the Israelis and the Palestinians is through its explicit regional focus and technical capacity building. In a forum which discusses water in technical and geographically larger terms than the specific water in dispute, the Israelis and the Palestinians were exposed to a broader perspective of the issue at hand. By enlarging the field of vision and providing technical tools to better understand the portion which is under dispute, the working group on water provided the space and the tools to look at the conflict over water as a joint problem rather than a zero sum game.

With the Middle East peace process back on track last fall after a long hiatus, efforts to resume the multilateral working group negotiations are underway. In February, the first meeting of the Steering Group, the umbrella group which oversees the activities of the working groups, resulted in an agreement for the working groups to meet by the first part of the year. [42] The ongoing activities of the working group on water which have continued in the absence of formal meetings have clearly resulted in better working relations and more understanding of the water related decisions that lie ahead for the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Along with these positive developments, the working group on water in this new round of meetings faces an important challenge: the participation of Syria and Lebanon. Although both countries are officially part of the process, in the past they have chosen not to participate in the multilaterals until more progress has been made in the bilaterals. A peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians could be made without the participation of Syria and Lebanon in the multilaterals. However, an agreement over water between Israel and Syria could significantly impact negotiations over water between Israel and the Palestinians. If the two countries decide to participate in future meetings of the working group on water, the format of the meetings and the ongoing projects were intentionally created to be inclusive and would enable them to be part of the process.

[1] Foreign Policy Bulletin: Documentary Record of the US Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, 1991) Vol 2. No. 1, 85.

[3] Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2.

[5] Wolf, Hydropolitics, 67.

[6] Lonergan and Brooks, 204.

[7] Cecilia Albin, “When the Weak Confront the Strong: Justice, Fairness, and Power in the Israel-PLO Interim Talks,” International Negotiation 4 (1999): 332.

[8] Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 1, 3.

[9] Miriam Lowi, “West Bank Water Resources and the Resolution of Conflict in the Middle East,” paper presented for the project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, (June 15-17) 1991, 8. See appendix for more information.

[10] Lonergan and Brooks, 135.

[11] Albin, 338, Dombrowsky, 94.

[13] Lonergan and Brooks, 130.

[15] National Public Radio transcript, “Troubled Waters: Conflict in the Middle East,” Living on Earth aired on October 3, 1997.

[17] The bilateral negotiations include the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

[18] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 85.

[19] The other groups themes were refugees, Arms Control and Regional Security, Environment, and Regional Economic Development.

[20] Stephen Libiszewski, “Integrating Political and Technical Approaches: Lessons from the Israeli-Jordanian Water Negotiations,” in Conflict and the Environment, ed. N.P. Gleditsch (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1997), 385.

[21] Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources, “From Contention to Cooperation, A Case Study of the Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources,” presented at the Second Annual World Water Forum, March 17-22, 2000.

[22] From Contention to Cooperation, 5.

[23] Aaron Wolf, “Multilateral Working Group Case Study,” received from author as part of the Transboundary Fresh Water Dispute Database, http://terra.geo.orst.edu/users/tfdd. See also Wolf, “International Water Dispute Resolution: The Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources,” Water International 20 (September 1995).

[26] Joel Peters, Building Bridges: The Arab-Israeli Multilateral Talks (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs: 1994), 13.

[29] Robert Bookmiller and Kirsten Bookmiller, “Behind the Headlines: The Multilateral Middle East Talks,” Current History 95 (January 1996), 34.

[30] Eisenberg and Caplan, 109.

[32] From Contention to Cooperation, 10.

[33] Wolf, Multilateral, 10.

[35] “Multilateral Working Groups on Water Resources Press Statements for June 22, 1995 and May 16, 1996” The Jewish Student Online Research Center. Http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/multiwater95.html on 5 May 1999.

[36] Wolf, Multilateral, 7 and 16.

[38] Interview with Aaron Wolf, April 14, 2000.

[41] Steve Rodan, “Divided Waters – Part 1,” The Jerusalem Post, 1 September 1995.