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One year before the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement, Israel and Jordan signed a historic peace treaty with the hope of establishing a “warm peace.” Like the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the subject of water between Israel and Jordan had long been an area of contention that played a key part of the final peace treaty. This final chapter examines three events which have taken place since the signing of the peace treaty with respect to the implementation of the water agreement. The first looks at a controversy about the quantity of water and the allocation of costs for future water resource development projects. The second involves a month long water pollution crisis in Jordan in the summer of 1998. The last example looks at the political consequences of a severe regional drought in 1999. By examining the implementation of the water agreement, the aim is to identify some key elements of the Israeli-Jordanian agreement which can provide valuable lessons for shaping a future permanent water agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Prior to signing the peace treaty, Israel and Jordan proceeded unilaterally with their own water development projects. Although publicly each country often expressed frustration with the other over water, certain discussions between Israel and Jordan over the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers were kept out of the public eye. In the 1950s, the Johnston negotiations led to a water management plan that was not formally accepted by Israel , Jordan , Lebanon and Syria . Political tensions between the countries prevented the Johnston agreement from being accepted, but the negotiations instigated an avenue for secret talks between Israeli and Jordanian water officials, which have continued up until the present day. Beginning in the 1970s, these so-called “Picnic Table Talks” have been held every two to three weeks at the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers to discuss quotas for each side. [1] With the recent peace talks between Israel and Jordan opening up a new pathway of relations, information about the secret talks began to surface. Three months before the signing of the treaty, Israeli Water Commissioner Gideon Tsur at a press conference openly admitted to the secret meetings with Jordan for over a decade. [2]

Like the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the peace talks between Israel and Jordan followed the same two-track structure using both a bilateral track and a multilateral track. The bilateral track was intended to focus on the more contentious political issues between the two countries including territory and security, whereas multilateral negotiations focused on creating a forum to discuss regional issues like the environment and water.

One significant difference with respect to the negotiations over water is that while the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians was over groundwater, the conflict between Israel and Jordan was primarily over surface water. The negotiations between Israel and Jordan focused on allocating water from the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers , as well as the status of a small amount of groundwater from the Arava Valley , which is located from the south of the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba crossing into both countries. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel controlled the Golan Heights , and in doing so gained access to the Upper Jordan and a greater portion of the northern shore of the Yarmuk including the King Abdullah Canal . Since this time, Jordan has criticized Israel for using the bulk of the waters in the Upper Jordan , arguing that the Johnston Plan, although never officially signed, allocated 100 mcm/yr of the Jordan River to Jordan . [3] A further area of contention was the issue of building a dam on the Yarmuk. In 1987, a dam proposal by Jordan and Syria was rejected by Israel on the grounds that the winter flows of the river would first need to be secured. Unable to resolve the dispute, Jordan asked for assistance from the United States , who sent United States State Department Ambassador Richard Armitage to assist in finding a solution. As an agreement began to unfold in 1990, other factors came to the forefront, especially the inability to engage Syria in discussions over the Yarmuk and the outbreak of the Gulf War, which ultimately brought the discussions to a halt. [4]

After nearly three years of negotiations, in a significant gesture of cooperation suggesting a move towards peaceful relations, in August 1994 Israel began to supply Jordan with 4 mcm of water from the Yarmuk to help alleviate their water shortage resulting from a winter drought. [5] Two months later, on October 26, 1994, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement ending 46 years of conflict. The agreement established full diplomatic relations and promoted broad cooperation in the areas of trade, tourism, water, environmental issues, and economic development, with the goal of creating a “warm peace” between the two countries. [6] A critical aspect of this warm peace was the agreement over water.

Similar to the water accords in the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement, the water agreement between Israel and Jordan begins by laying out general principles for managing water resources. These principles include the commitment to prevent harm to the water resources of the other party, the prevention of contamination of water resources, mutual assistance during water shortages, joint research and development in water-related subjects and cooperation over finding new water resources. [7]

These principles take shape in Appendix II, which describes the details for implementing the water-related matters of the agreement. The articles in Annex II delineate the allocations of the Yarmuk and the Jordan Rivers between the two countries. For the Yarmuk River, Israel is allocated a specific amount both for the summer (12 mcm) and the winter period (13 mcm), with Jordan receiving the rest of the flow. For the Jordan River , Jordan is allowed to store 20 mcm of water during the winter months as part of a future water storage project on the Yarmuk. In return, Israel is to transfer 20 mcm of water during the summer. Jordan is also entitled to 10 mcm of desalinated water and an additional 50 mcm of water to be provided in the future. [8] The most innovative section of the agreement concerns the solution to the land-water ownership of the Arava Valley . In a creative compromise, Israel is allowed to retain access to some of the groundwater resources which it acquired in the 1948 war, but are now located on the Jordanian side of the border. The territory is under Jordanian sovereignty, but the water belongs to Israel, with provisions for increasing abstractions up to 10 mcm within five years of the implementation of the treaty. Finally, similar to the water accords of the Oslo II agreement, a Joint Water Committee was established for the purposes of implementing the agreement.

With the signing of the peace treaty, relations between Israel and Jordan over water suddenly became public and open to scrutiny. For three years, Israel dutifully transferred 50 mcm of water to Jordan, which is stored in Lake Tiberias according to the terms of the treaty. Yet, disagreement ensued over the additional water resources promised to Jordan in the treaty. Exactly how much and who was to pay for them was under dispute. Around this time the media began to document the difficulties of implementing the water agreement. In May 1997, regional and international news sources concurred that the agreement was clear in purpose but ambiguous with details. [9] Stories in The Jerusalem Post and The Economist lay out the points of contention over the quantity of water Israel was supposed to transfer to Jordan, the means of transporting the water and the question of which country would pay for additional water development projects. These problems were related to the provisions in Article I in Annex II of the agreement which describes the allocation of the water from the Yarmuk and the Jordan Rivers and provisions for additional water.

The interpretation of Section 3 of Article I in particular had become a great source of frustration. This section calls for both countries to work together to find an additional 50 mcm of water for Jordan specifying a one year deadline for a plan to be drawn up. A year and half later, the issue had not been resolved. Israel proposed using desalination to provide Jordan the extra water with the costs being shared by both countries. This proposal was unacceptable to the Jordanians who argued that the water was theirs outright and that the agreement said nothing about cost sharing. It was only after Jordan charged Israel with signing another agreement that it never intended to implement that the dispute was addressed. Responding to this charge, President Netanyahu secretly met with President Hussein and agreed to transfer another 25 mcm of water to Jordan, though it was not entirely clear where the water would come from. [10]

One year after this dispute was resolved, Jordan experienced a month long water pollution crisis which sparked accusations that the problems were the result of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. The crisis began on July 5, 1998 when residents in the Jordanian capital of Amman began to notice a strange smell and taste to their drinking water. At first, the government attributed the change in water to high temperatures, which had created a suitable environment for moss to grow in Jordan’s reservoirs. [11] While tests were being run to pinpoint the exact source of the pollution, Jordanian Minister of Water and Irrigation Mundhir Haddadin took pains to deny any link between the water problem and Israel saying, “The water pipe that pumps water to us is the same one that provides many Israeli settlements around the Yarmuk triangle with water. We get the same water they do and they distill it just as we do.” [12] However, as it became evident that the contaminated water was coming from the Zay water treatment station which receives water from Lake Tiberias, a group of opposition parties began to blame Israel for the water pollution and called for the abrogation of the peace treaty. [13]

Throughout the crisis in July and August, the Jordanian government consistently took the stance that the water contamination was due to human and technical faults. When reports came out that the contamination came from a high concentration of algae from the Yarmuk River and Lake Tiberias, not only was the Jordanian government put under the gun, but the Israeli-Jordanian treaty was too. King Hussein, who was hospitalized in the United States at the time, came down hard on his government for not being able to produce a firm explanation of the water problem. [14] Ultimately, the entire cabinet was forced to resign over the incident. [15]

The political turmoil resulting from the water crisis effectively tested the implementation of the water agreement. What’s interesting is that despite the calls from Jordanian political opposition parties for the abrogation of the peace treaty and the severe political fallout that followed, both governments worked together to try to solve the water pollution problem. It is telling that midway through the water crisis, a group of engineers from Jordan went to Israel to consult with some of their water purification experts. [16]

This is an example of a crisis due to human and technical problems, not a failure of water agreement. With respect to water transfers, Section 4 of Article II says, “The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at any given location shall be equivalent to the quality of the water used from the same location by the supplying country.” [17] The implication that Israel had been transferring contaminated water was unfounded and clearly politically motivated, especially given the fact that the water coming from Israel was also was also used by them. Rather, as Haddadin had claimed from the beginning, the water contamination resulted from inadequacies from Jordan’s water treatment plant.

Less than a year after the water crisis in Jordan, the water agreement faced its most serious challenge in the form of a severe regional drought. With rainfall dipping to below 2 percent of its seasonal average in January 1999, Jordan officially declared a state of drought. By March, both Israel and Jordan were expressing deep concerns about their respective country’s water situation and the potential for drastic shortages during the summer. With the real threat of worsening conditions for the region’s overall water resources, Israel and Jordan fell into disagreement over the implementation of their water agreement. Faced with a severe drought both governments were adamant that the other side was interpreting the water agreement inappropriately.

With the Yarmuk River and Lake Tiberias reaching their lowest levels in 20 years, the dispute began in mid-March 1999 when Israel requested a reduction of the amount of water it was required to supply to Jordan according to the peace treaty. [18] Noting that the water agreement lacked provisions for a drought, Israel’s Water Commissioner Meir Ben-Meir pointed out that their request was the result of an extreme situation which was also forcing Israel to take deep cuts in its own water usage. Unmoved by this claim, the Israeli request created an outcry from Jordan who demanded that Israel hold up its full water commitment under their peace treaty. After a week of negotiations, Jordan walked out of a meeting stating that the government categorically refused to redefine water shares in Lake Tiberias. [19] The situation hit a low point shortly afterward when Jordan threatened Israel with “appropriate actions” if Israel reduced its water share. [20]

A breakthrough in the dispute came five weeks later in the form of a compromise. By allowing for some flexibility in the delivery timetable of the water, Israel agreed to provide Jordan with the full share of water according to their peace treaty. [21]

The dispute had been resolved, but not without causing serious political tension between the two countries. The consequences of the severe drought had revealed a significant weakness in the water agreement of the peace treaty with its lack of provisions for such a situation.

These three examples point out some key issues in the implementation of the Israeli-Jordanian water agreement. First, a water agreement should have clear language for setting out water allocations and cost allocations. Ambiguity will only lead to future disputes, as has been the case between Israel and Jordan over planning and financial responsibility on future water resource development projects. Even with clear language, problems can still arise, such as the month long pollution crisis. However, as this situation illustrated, a problem can be more easily resolved if there is clarity in the agreement. Section 4 of Article II could have been left out or been completely different, but its clarity created an unambiguous standard for Israel and Jordan to follow. Ultimately, the pollution crisis was shown to be the result of human error, not from ambiguous language or a breach of the agreement. Second, in a water scarce region like the Middle East, provisions for emergency situations such as an extreme drought are essential in an agreement. Had there been such a section in the Israeli-Jordanian water agreement, tensions might still have arisen but the two countries would have had a procedure to address the situation. These issues, clear language about water and cost allocations, and provisions for extreme events such as a drought, are important considerations for both Israel and the Palestinians as they move forward toward a permanent peace. As such, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty provides valuable lessons learned for a future water agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

[1] Liat Collins, David Makovsky and Jose Rosenfield, “Water Allocation Talks between Israel and Jordan no Longer Hidden from View,” The Jerusalem Post, 1 August 1994. See also “Israel, Jordan Held Secret Water Talks,” United Press International, 18 July 1994.

[3] Libiszewski, 388.

[4] Aaron Wolf, Yarmuk Negotiations case study, part of Transboundary Fresh Water Dispute Database, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/, 7.

[5] David Rudge, “Israel to Give Water to Jordan Temporarily,” The Jerusalem Post, 9 August 1994.

[6] Clyde Haberman, “The Jordan-Israeli Accord: An Overview,” The New York Times 27 October 1994.

[7] Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 26 October 1994. See article 6.

[8] Ibid, Annex 2.

[9] David Rudge, “Water Pact Difficult to Implement,” The Jerusalem Post, 11 May 1997, 2. See also “Water Politics, Jordan asks for more,” The Economist 17 May 1997, 52.

[10] “Water Politics, Jordan asks for more,” 52.

[11] Ibtisam Awadat, “Despite Outcry, Officials Reassure Public,” The Star 16 July 1998.

[12] “Ministers Deny Allegations of Water Pollution, Israeli Involvement,” transcript of Radio Amman Jordan, 21 July 1998.

[13] “Jordan Opposition Coalition Calls on Government to Resign,” Jordan Times, 8 August 1998.

[14] “Jordanian Government in Crisis over Water Scandal,” Xinhua News Agency, 8 August 1998.

[15] Jamal Halaby, “Jordanian Cabinet Resigns, King designates new Prime Minister,” The Associated Press, 19 August 1998.

[16] “Israelis, Palestinians Work Together on Water Purification,” Middle East News, 19 August 1998.

[17] Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, Article II.

[18] Danna Harman, “Jordan rejects Israel’s request to reduce Water Transfer,” The Jerusalem Post, 15 March 1999. See also Christopher Walker, “Jordan Protests at Israeli Water Cut,” The Times, 16 March 1999.

[19] “Delegation Head says Amman Cannot Renegotiate Water Shares with Israel,” Shihan, 21 March 1999.

[20] “Jordan Threatens “Appropriate” response if Israel reduces Water Share,” Al-Sharq al-Aswat, 22 March 1999.

[21] “Jordanian Minister says Israel to Provide Jordan’s Full Share of Water,” Jordan Times, 9 May 1999.